Clorox vs. P&G: How an Incumbent Deters Potential Entrants

Columbia Professor Rita McGrath recently tweeted a link to this interview of former P&G CEO A.G. Lafley, and she noted that it is a terrific example of competitive gamesmanship.  It sure is!  Here's what Lafley said, when asked to describe one of his failures at P&G:


"In the 1980s P&G tried to get into the bleach business. We had a differentiated and superior product—a color-safe low-temperature bleach. We created a brand called Vibrant. We went to test-market in Portland, Maine.  We thought the test market was so far from Oakland, California, where Clorox was headquartered, that maybe we could fly under the radar there. So we went in with what we thought was a winning launch plan: full retail distribution, heavy sampling and couponing, and major TV advertising. All designed to drive high consumer awareness and trial of a new bleach brand and a better bleach product.  Do you know what Clorox did? They gave every household in Portland, Maine, a free gallon of Clorox bleach—delivered to the front door. Game, set, match to Clorox. We’d already bought all the advertising. We’d spent most of the launch money on sampling and couponing. And nobody in Portland, Maine, was going to need bleach for several months. I think they even gave consumers a $1 off coupon for the next gallon. They basically sent us a message that said, “Don’t ever think about entering the bleach category.”

When teaching strategy, I talk to students about how incumbents can use various techniques to deter potential entrants.  In some cases, though, those moves to aggressively fight entrants can be very costly.  To cut prices substantially, for instance, can be very expensive.  If you are a large incumbent, and the entrant is quite small, a large price cut can be a costly way to try to keep a start-up out of your market.  Here, though, Clorox found a way to send a powerful SIGNAL that they were READY to fight aggressively, and that was enough to make P&G rethink their move into the bleach business.  The beauty of an effective signal, such as this one, is that it is far less expensive than ACTUALLY HAVING TO FIGHT THE WAR.   The neat thing about this story, of course, is also that Clorox was so good at scanning its environment that it was able to detect this move by P&G even at such an embryonic stage.  Great firms pay close attention to possible future entrants, and they have thought in advance about who might attack their position.  Clorox seems to have done so in this case.

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Starbucks, Price Decreases, & Game Theory

Business Week has an interesting article about the recent decision by Starbucks to cut prices on its coffee sold in grocery stores by $1 per bag.  According to the article, "Last quarter the company collected about $380 million from sales outside its cafés at an operating margin of 25.5 percent. At that level, the coffee empire is making a profit of about $2.55 per bag. Take away $1 per, and Starbucks would have to sell 65 percent more bags to book the same amount of profit." 

Wow... could Starbucks really generate that many more sales to make up for the lost margin?  Unlikely.   The article tries to offer another explanation, citing Columbia Professor Rita McGrath.   Here's an excerpt:

It’s not clear Starbucks will sway that many customers quickly. But the company could be betting on widening income inequality—what academics call “the hourglass economy.” The theory is: Major retail growth has been—and will continue to be—at the low and the high ends of the socioeconomic scale. Starbucks already has plenty of $6 barista-brewed drinks to capture the top of that market, but a bag of $10 coffee is very much in the middle, according to Rita McGrath, a professor at Columbia Business School.

I respect McGrath's work a great deal.  She's a terrific strategy scholar.   However, I don't understand this point.  How is cutting the price of a bag from $10 to $9 enabling Starbucks to tackle the "low end of the market"?   That's some view of the low end!  The article continues by citing the fact that lower-end rivals such as Maxwell House, Folgers, and Dunkin' Donuts have cut prices this year as costs of coffee beans have fallen significantly.  Here's another excerpt:

And here’s where a little game theory comes into play...By committing to lower prices (and not using coupons or sales), Starbucks is sending a signal, McGrath says. It’s serious about the low end of the market; Dunkin’ Donuts, Folgers, and other competitors can either trim their margins further or give up volume. Either way, they lose. So does Starbucks, at least in the near term. But with savvy hedging and customers lining up for expensive lattes—including increasing crowds in China—it can stand the pain for a while. And it is betting it is more efficient than its competitors. As McGrath says: “If you can run economically enough to make money at the lower price, you’re simply taking money out of your competitors’ pockets.”

Again, I'm not sure that I understand or agree completely.    If Starbucks was clearly the low-cost competitor, I might understand this explanation.  It would be using its scale economies and cost efficiencies to attack its higher cost rivals.  However, do we really believe Starbucks is the low-cost player in this market?  That seems unlikely.   Perhaps another explanation is that, after Dunkin' and others cut prices this year, the gap between Starbucks and its lower-priced rivals became too large.  Starbucks' differentiated, high quality product could justify higher prices, but not that much higher.  The gap in price had simply exceeded the difference in perceived value (or willingness-to-pay) between Starbucks and other coffee rivals in the grocery aisle.  If it didn't address that issue, it would have ceded a great deal of volume to competitors.  Differentiated players always have to be careful that their price premium doesn't grow too high, exceeding the excess value that customers perceive in their product vs. rivals' products. 

If Starbucks, on the other hand, is truly just going for share at the low-end of the market, then I don't understand the logic of the strategy.  Why would a differentiated player cut its margins and try to compete directly with low-cost players?   Why compromise its premium positioning?  I don't think Starbucks is doing that... I don't see them getting into a price war in the grocery aisle just to inflict pain on their rivals.  The coffee industry is an attractive one, particularly at the higher end of the market.  Why would a market leader spoil that market by triggering an unnecessary price war?  That would be bad strategy. 

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Retailers, Black Friday, & A Prisoner's Dilemma

We've certainly heard a great deal over the past few days about the controversy surrounding the decision by many retailers to open on Thanksgiving evening.   Regardless of where you stand on that issue, you should ask yourself:  Are these retailers actually generating incremental sales and profits by opening at 8pm on Thanksgiving or at midnight, as opposed to early on the morning of Black Friday?   Perhaps they are, but I suspect that they are simply shifting sales which otherwise would have occurred on Black Friday or thereafter.   People aren't buying more items overall this Christmas; they are simply buying them a bit sooner as a result of the Thanksgiving day openings. 

Why are firms pursuing these policies if they are unlikely to drive incremental sales and profit?  I think it's because the retailers are caught in a prisoner's dilemma.  If they all chose to wait and open on Black Friday at 6:00am, they would be better off as a whole.  However, each retailer is worried that it will lose out if it remains closed while rivals open on Thanksgiving night.  Therefore, each retailer opens up earlier and earlier, for fear of ceding sales to rivals. 

How can firms extricate themselves from this losing proposition?  Well, the retailers cannot legally collude to shift openings back to Black Friday morning.  However, they can try to achieve some form of tacit collusion, or they can try to influence and signal to one another in a way that leads to cooperative behavior for the greater good.  Typically, such cooperation emerges if you have a strong market leader who can influence the behavior of smaller rivals.  Could Wal-Mart serve that function?   It seems unlikely, because even though they are enormous, rivals would probably jump at the opportunity to steal sales from them.  That's why we probably will see this trend of early openings continue, though it may not be enlarging retailer profits by much at all. 

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